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On the thirteenth and fourteenth of February 1987, a distinguished
group of scholars gathered at the University of Florida College of
Law to share their ideas on the topic of due process. The occasion
was the law faculty's observance of the bicentennial of the United
States Constitution. The topic of due process was particularly suitable
for that observance because a good case can be made that it is the
most fundamental constitutional guarantee in our system. Various freedoms protected in the Bill of Rights, such as speech, press, and religion, receive much more attention from the media and in the popular
mind. Equal protection often receives much more attention in the
courts and in the legal literature. But all of these other guarantees
are meaningless without the foundation provided by a firm guarantee
that the legal procedures will adhere to principles of due process. The
protection of our liberty in the guarantee of free speech remains only
a paper protection unless the courts are under an obligation to reach
rational, non-arbitrary decisions. Hence, it is especially appropriate
that these scholars devoted their attention to the fundamentally important topic of the meaning of due process.

*Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. B.S. Southern Methodist University, 1958; M.A., LL.B. 1962; LL.M. University of Sydney, 1966.
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The meaning of due process seems beguilingly simple but turns
out to be highly complex. Even the eighteen papers included in this
symposium do not collectively do justice to all aspects of due process.
Perhaps three times the space would be required to deal adequately
with all of the nuances of this deep and complex topic. However, in
these papers certain fundamental themes emerge that are characteristic of the topic as a whole. The most obvious fundamental theme is
the issue of the nature of due process itself. More specifically, the
issue is how the nature of due process is reflected in our vision of the
nature of law. On the one hand, we have scholars who see due process
as a kind of heavenly venture in which due process represents the
quest for legality. This is the optimistic view. On the other hand, we
have scholars of a more skeptical bent who see due process as nothing
but - or at least the tendency toward - the degeneration of law
into an over-technical legalism. This latter view is most famously represented in the morbid prediction of Grant Gilmore that "[i]n hell
there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously
observed."' Our authors write in the context of this conflict between
two views of due process. Is due process a benefit - something
desirable in a legal system - the transcendence of law over itself?
Or is due process merely the triumph of the lawyer's technical preoccupation with the defeat of just ends?
In the context of that conflict between good and evil visions of due
process of law, the authors in this symposium pursue certain themes
regarding the nature of due process. Some papers emphasize the notion
of fairness as the essence of due process. Others emphasize the integrity of the legal system itself as the true fundamental meaning of due
process. Yet other papers emphasize the fundamental reciprocity between the government and its citizens that represents the spirit of
due process. All of these themes and more are presented here. All
find themselves struggling between the tensions of that fundamental
conflict between visions of due process as good and as evil. Let me
now turn my attention to some of the specific themes brought out in
the papers for the conference.
I.

DUE PROCESS AS FUNDAMENTAL RECIPROCITY

Lea Brilmayer points out the narrow focus of most contemporary
procedural due process analysis. 2 Instead, Professor Brilmayer invites

1. Gilmore, The Storrs Lectures: The Age of Anxiety, 84 YALE L.J. 1022, 1044 (1975).
2. Brilmayer, JurisdictionalDue Process and PoliticalTheory, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 293,
293-94 (1987).
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us to consider the deeper and more challenging problems of jurisdictional due process. She surveys the various rationales offered to justify
jurisdiction, which include territorialism, membership in a community,
benefits provided by the state, and implied consent of the governed.
All of these various rationales, however, turn out to rest upon reciprocity between the citizen and the government. Hence, the courts
repeatedly speak of "reciprocal obligations."3 From her survey, Professor Brilmayer concludes that, although the rationales worked out in
the judicial decisions are inadequate, they nonetheless do in their
fundamental points mirror the more sophisticated justifications for
governmental power that are to be found in political theory.
One important point Professor Brilmayer brings out in her analysis
is an emphasis on the fact that due process, at least in its jurisdictional
form, cannot be satisfied merely by fairness. In many situations the
process to be imposed is quite fair, but the objection under jurisdictional due process is that the government that seeks to impose that
process lacks the legal competence to do so. Hence, other justifications
must be sought for that exercise of governmental power. Such questions, Professor Brilmayer correctly observes, raise the most fundamental questions of political philosophy. Professor Brilmayer's answer
to those issues takes refuge finally in the concept of reciprocity between government and citizen. That basis is consistent with democratic
principles and the ideals of impartiality in the legal system that are
exemplified by the notion of due process.
This point is underscored in Carl Wellman's comment on Professor
Brilmayer's paper.4 He observes that the answer to this question may
be found in Lord Coke's interpretation of Magna Carta, because Coke
saw the rationality of the common law as resting on its judicial procedures.5 Wellman may seem to be reinterpreting Brilmayer's focus on
reciprocity in terms of reason. However, that is not the case, because
the basis for that common law rationality is itself a form of tacit

3. Id. at 303. Professor Brilmayer states: "[Tihe state may demand reciprocal duty from
an absent citizen." Id.
4. Wellman, Commentary on Brilmayer: Jurisdiction,Fairnessand Rights, 39 U. FLA.
L. REV. 315 (1987).
5. Id. at 320. Professor Wellman states:
Coke believed the traditional rights of Englishmen recognized in the common law
were protected by the judicial procedures required by that same common law. This
is no accident, but a necessary consequence of the rationality of the common law.
The same reason that makes evident the rights of the individual dictates the
reasonable procedures established in the courts of common law.
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consent,6 and tacit consent arises from the reciprocity between citizen
and government that is reflected in the due process clause.
II.

DUE PROCESS AS DIGNITARY PROCESS

Jerry Mashaw also pursues the theme of legality and legalism in
his contribution to the symposium. He begins with a detailed study
of Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.7 He criticizes the
Court's handling of the Loudermill case in terms that amount to a
condemnation of legalism. In this case, the legalism is a reading of a
technical right to appeal into the process provided by the state law
challenged in that case. Loudermill contested the fact that the state
process provided a post-termination hearing. The Court agreed with
his complaint and imposed upon the state a pre-termination right to
a hearing. Professor Mashaw sees this result as one that trivializes
due process.8 He proposes an improvement by moving to a natural
rights approach in which "liberal democratic values" would form the
core of the due process analysis.
Professor Mashaw's attack on the Court's legalism in its due process
analysis shows up again in his condemnation of formal distinctions as
"notoriously unstable." 9 Instead, he believes that "[pirotection against
Kafkaesque, unlimited discretion of officials, is the underlying goal of
the due process clause." 10 The best-known popular example of legalism
is Joseph Heller's novel Catch-22.11 Professor Mashaw provides an
example of a legal Catch-22 that results from the Court's current
formalistic jurisprudence. The Court holds, on one hand, that failure
to follow standards indicates a deprivation of due process. On the
other hand, the failure to provide standards indicates a lack of entitlement and therefore that there is no right protected by due process.
The consequence is, Professor Mashaw observes, that "[d]iscretion

6. Id. at 320-21. Professor Wellman continues: "[A]ny deprivation of life, liberty, or property
by due process of law is no violation of individual rights because in consenting to lawful authority
the individuals have, to this limited extent, waived their rights." Id.
7. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
8. Mashaw, DignitaryProcess:A PoliticalPsychology of Liberal Democratic Citizenship,
39 U. FLA. L. REv. 433, 434 (1987). Professor Mashaw sees Loudenill as at odds with
"concerns that lie at the base of due process protections and unreasonably interfere with judgments about the appropriate balance of procedural and substantive rights made by local, state,
and federal governments." Id.
9. Id. at 436.
10. Id. at 437.
11.

J. HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961).
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bounded by standards requires due process; but absolute discretion
• . .escapes constitutional notice under the current analysis."

Professor Mashaw proposes to replace this legalism with an analysis
of due process based on fundamental tenets of what he calls natural
rights. These natural rights are based on assumptions about the necessary dignity of the individual in a liberal democratic state. From these
postulates, Mashaw concludes that there are three essential elements
of due process in a liberal democratic regime. These elements include
the necessity of zones of privacy, the operation of democratic decisionmaking, and perhaps most interestingly that "the law must be reasonably transparent and comprehensible to its subjects."' 3 Professor
Mashaw's dignitary perspective would produce greater rights to due
process in some cases and more modest due process rights in other
cases such as that of Loudermill upon which Mashaw focuses.14 With
such carefully balanced conclusions, Professor Mashaw presents a persuasive case that insight into the nature of due process is yielded by
focusing on the dignity of the individuals who participate in the governmental process.
In his comment on Professor Mashaw's paper, Martin Golding seeks
to take Mashaw's analysis further. For example, he asks whether the
process employed in a decisionmaking situation and the techniques
of decision are separable. His conclusion: they are not.15 What Professor Golding describes here is the kind of point that Lon Fuller observed
long ago as a morality of adjudication and of other forms of legal
decisionmaking.16 Each process has its own particular forms and processes that are peculiar to it. Professor Golding takes this analysis
further in enlarging upon Professor Mashaw's focus on human dignity

12.

MASHAW, supra note 8, at 438. Professor Mashaw, however, may overlook the differ-

ence between reviewing the application of legal standards and attempting to review the exercise
of managerial direction, unguided by rules.
13. Id. at 439.
14. It seems unclear, however, that Professor Mashaw's dignitary process must be limited

in its justification of political theory to a liberal democratic state. It would appear possible to
justify dignitary process also on the basis of at least some conservative or even radical communitarian political theories. In those cases the justification would be not because the individual as
such was entitled to the dignity imparted by the dignitary process, but rather that the dignity
of that process was one that characterized the society that members of that polity strove to

achieve.
15. Professor Golding states: "Although there is a requirement of fairness and neutrality
that pervades the model situations, the criteria of neutrality and fairness are context-relative."
Golding, Commentary on Mashaw:Processand Psychology, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 445,449 (1987).
16. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 3.
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as the basis of the process. In so doing, he shows that dignity is going
to be realized in different ways within the context of the varying
procedures. Dignity will be realized in a more formal way in an adjudicative setting, in a less formal way in a setting of conciliation or
mediation. Professor Golding's point is that the procedure of adjudication requires a certain distancing between the parties. Hence, it is
appropriate to strangers rather than to family members. As we all
know, it operates in opposition to the natural strains of friendship and
bonds within the family. Professor Golding believes that that is because
rights discourse has its natural home in the strangerhood relationship. 17
Such friendly strangers, of course, are appropriate role models for
citizens, though inappropriate for family members. In bringing out
this point, Professor Golding makes clearer the limitations as well as
the advantages of the dignity that due process is supposed to impart
in Professor Mashaw's view.
III.

DUE PROCESS AS INTEGRITY

Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. undertakes to relate the general issue of
due process to the vicissitudes of the adjudication of the exclusionary
rule under the fourth amendment by the Supreme Court of the United
States. He does so by relating due process to Lon Fuller's concept of
the Internal Morality of Law. s Baldwin sees the internal morality as
"a precondition to the existence of a civilized legal system."'19 This
civilized legal system he equates with the requirement of due process
under our Constitution. 20 This fundamental requirement of internal
morality of law, which is equated with due process, Baldwin sees as
reflected in the demand for governmental integrity. The Court's obligation under the Constitution, he argues, is to maintain the integrity
of governmental, and particularly, of judicial processes. He then undertakes to examine whether the Court has upheld this obligation in its
adjudication under the fourth amendment.
His examination produces a trenchant criticism of the Court for
destroying the integrity of the adjudicative process in fourth amendment cases. He accuses the Court of employing instead a legalistic

17. Golding, supra note 15, at 450.
18. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
19.

LAW

33-94 (rev. ed. 1969).

Baldwin, Due Process and the Exclusionary Rule: Integrity and Justification, 39 U.

L. REV. 505, 506 (1987).
20. Id. at 506. Professor Baldwin states: "Without due process, application of the rules we
live by would be less than meaningful." Id.
FLA.
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approach to the fourth amendment that vitiates its integrity.21 Professor Baldwin does not ignore the concept of due process as fairness.
Instead, he sees integrity as the critical ingredient in insuring fairness. 2 After a review of the considerations both in favor of and against
restriction of the exclusionary rule, Professor Baldwin concludes that
fourth amendment protections are essential to a free society.2
Nonetheless, he does, at least implicitly, recognize that the issue is
a difficult one. He states that "although the conclusions of the present
Court in the exclusionary rule area are less than constitutionally moral
in their focus, at the least they reflect the current popular attitude
toward crime."- Nonetheless, he concludes that a proper focus on the
integrity of the guilt determination process should at least lead the
Court to achieve its cutting down of the exclusionary rule "with a
more principled scalpel."
Professor Baldwin's indictment of the Court's exclusionary rule
jurisprudence is forceful. In the process of that indictment, he makes
the point that quite major intrusions into privacy are tolerated by the
Court's current exclusionary rule jurisprudence. A revealing contrast
is provided by Professor Mashaw's criticism of the elaborate due process provided to the discharged school bus driver in the Loudermill
case. Ironically, Loudermill could have been convicted on the basis of
evidence seized in an illegal police burglary of his home. That evidence
might be admitted under the Court's loosening exclusionary rule standards. On the other hand, when Loudermill lied about the felony conviction on his school bus driver application and was later discharged
when the lie was discovered, he is entitled, according to the current
Court, to the due process of a hearing before his termination even
though that step is not provided by state law. This hypothetical may
be a good example of the miscalculation of priorities of which both
Professors Baldwin and Mashaw complain.
Ronald Akers' commentary on Professor Baldwin's paper makes
two interesting points. One is that the rule appears to be better

21. Id. at 511. Professor Baldwin calls the Court's procedure a "cynical emasculation of a
rule designed to insure integrity of process." Id.
22. Id. at 515.
23. Id. at 539. He states that "security against unrestrained police intrusion is elemental
to this free society and lies at the heart of the fourth amendment

. .

. ," id., and that "the

Court . . . [is] disguising [its] agenda in a shroud of obfuscation and casuistic rhetoric." Id.
24. Baldwin, supra note 19, at 542.
25. Id. at 543.
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observed by law enforcement personnel than the Court's decisions
sometimes seem to assume. Moreover, law enforcement agencies, according to Professor Akers' research, take pride in their adherence
to the rules. On the basis of this evidence, there would appear to be
a much less persuasive case than is often assumed in favor of cutting
back the exclusionary rule on the suppositions that it hampers the
police and that it fails to deter them from illegal conduct. Professor
Akers' evidence suggests that both of those propositions would not
be well-supported. On the basis of that evidence, Professor Akers
proceeds to concur with Professor Baldwin's conclusion that "integrity
of the law, rather than deterrence, [is] the central purpose of the
rule."26

Francis Allen takes a different tack in his comment on Professor
Baldwin's paper. He steps back and takes a longer view, raising the
question of what benefit such detailed attention to the due process
analysis of the Warren Court has for contemporary criminal law
scholarship. Nonetheless, he agrees with Professor Baldwin's assessment of the Court's current jurisprudence, going so far as to say that
"[i]t is a product of the dominant intellectual mode employed by the
Supreme Court and delineated by Professor Baldwin. This approach
eschews principle and concern for the integrity of the criminal justice
process and, instead, employs a shallow and mean-spirited pragmatism, intent on securing small law enforcement advantages in individual cases."27 Moreover, Professor Allen enlarges on that condemnation on the basis of a more extensive, albeit cursory, survey of contemporary judicial attention to the criminal justice system. His criticism
is broader and ultimately, therefore, even more telling than Professor
Baldwin's.? Still, in the face of such a comprehensive statement of
the challenges we face, he concludes with an exhortation to aspire to
the objective of due process, citing the great scholar Max Radin that
"[w]hat we seek ... is a juster justice and a more lawful law. "2

26.

Akers, Commentary on Baldwin, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 551, 554 (1987). He continues:

' The operation and effect of the rule fit this concept and the empirical evidence better than
deterrence. The integrity rationale is supported by public perception and is a model of professional, constitutionally-sound law enforcement for the police." Id.
27. Allen, Commentary on Baldwin, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 545, 546 (1987).
28. See id. at 548. Professor Allen concludes: "Generally, the system regularly fails in its
preventive and incapacitative functions; is most imperfectly constrained by the principles of
legality; and often denies human values of which the due process concept represents one expression." Id.
29.
OF

Id. at 550 (citing Radin, A JusterJustice, a More Lawful Law, in ESSAYS IN HONOR

O.K. MCMURRAY 537-64 (1927)).
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IV. DUE PROCESS AS PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Judith Resnik directs her remarks to the role of the public in
adjudicative processes. Her examination reveals that, while there has
been general agreement that the public should have a right to be
present at judicial proceedings, there has been no emergence of a
clear set of reasons why that should be so. In her examination of the
case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,30 she finds at least
five different rationales buried in the various concurring opinions.
These five rationales are history, catharsis, education, control, and
accuracy.3 1 Professor Resnik finds each of these proffered rationales
somewhat inadequate3 and adds a sixth of her own. Her additional
rationale is an interactive, norm-generative function. The result of
this interaction of the public with the legal process is that "by having
public participation, we gain the possibility of generating shared narratives of powerful significance." However, Professor Resnik finds
that even her own additional rationale for public participation of interaction to assist in the expression and generation of norms is itself
not fully adequate as a justification for the public role in the legal
process.
Professor Resnik's caution seems to be be generated by the conviction that it is perilous to try to fit many different, individual cases
under a broad general rule. Clearly there are many different kinds of
judicial proceedings involving varying considerations of the public interest in participation. Professor Resnik's argument appears addressed, not so much to an absolute rule of public participation in the
process, as to a general presumption in favor of public participation
in the legal process. Professor Resnik is struck not only by the variety
of conventional judicial proceedings, but even more by the greater
array of proceedings that is now emerging in which the claim is possible
that the proceedings are not public.
This emergence of forms of alternative dispute resolution with
some connection to judicial proceedings obviously concerns Professor
Resnik deeply. Her nightmare is apparent. It is not that some judicial
30. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
31. Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405, 416 (1987).
32. Id. at 417 ('With a Courtroom closed, the interaction between public and process is
limited.").
33. Id. Professor Resnik states: "[The norms are generated in the course of the interaction
among disputants and adjudicator, and among disputants, adjudicator, and the public." Id.
34. Id. at 419.
35. Id. at 431. She asks "consideration of the public aspect of due process as the new
institutions of dispute resolution are being installed in our courts and as courts defer to other
modes of decisionmaking." Id.
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proceedings will be closed to the public under rare and exceptional
circumstances. Rather, the vision she fears is one in which the many
forms of nonjudicial dispute resolution now coming into favor will be
considered on some blanket basis as out of the public realm and therefore not open to public observation. Such a wholesale exclusion of
public participation from segments of the legal process would certainly
impinge quite markedly on the various interests secured by the
rationales articulated in the existing judicial decisions. That exclusion
would certainly be contrary to the public interest articulated in Professor Resnik's additional rationale of interaction by the public in the
process to assist in the expression and generation of norms. A major
exclusion of the public from significant segments of the legal process
would be inimical to the interest expressed in the interaction rationale.
Professor Resnik's fear is one of a legalistic result, but her hope is
based on a vision of legality. In her vision public interaction in the
judicial process is a central feature of the growth and development of
law. That vision of law is built upon the fundamental quality of due
process: the aspiration to legality.

V. DUE PROCESS AS A ROLE FOR LIBERTY
Timothy Terrell completes his "entitlement" quartet with his contribution to this symposium.36 Thus, he writes in a rich context of his
own prior analysis of the more focused problems of procedural due
process that have dominated the Court's attention in recent years.
Like our other writers, he joins in criticism of the Court's analysis,
specifically on the common ground that the judicial response has been
lacking in the qualities of legality and has degenerated into legalism.: 7
The specific focus of Professor Terrell's work on procedural due process
has been the problem of the procedures that are due in what are
known as entitlement cases. As he points out, this line of thinking
dates back to Charles Reich's classic article The New Propertys that
conveyed "his somber and depressing view of contemporary life." 3"

36. For citations to Professor Terrell's three previous articles on this topic, see Terrell,
Liberty and Responsibility in the Land of "New Property":Exploring the Limits of Procedural
Due Process, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 351, 353 n.2 (1987).
37. See id. at 352. Professor Terrell states: "Much of that derogatory analysis is based on
the Court's failure to identify any consistent, meaningful, or comprehensive theory of the due
process clause as the starting point or the organizing principle for its analysis." Id.
38. Id. at 353 (citing Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)).
39. Id. at 354.
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Terrell calls Reich's answer to this melancholy view "big law." 40 The
development of constitutional law since Reich's seminal article has
clarified that the crucial question is how much process one is due in
cases involving entitlements. 41 How is that to be decided? Under the
current Court's jurisprudence, a close analysis of the concepts of property and liberty is required.42
In the course of his analysis, Professor Terrell discusses the dignitary process analysis of his fellow contributor Professor Mashaw. 43 Professor Terrell objects, however, that "individual dignity never seems
to include individual responsibility for one's unforced choices."- Professor Terrell says that he agrees with Professor Mashaw that "procedural fairness or nonarbitrariness is an independent normative value
itself."45 However, because of his difficulties with the abstract quality
of human dignity, he would prefer to root the concept in "the notion
of balance between the individual and government. ' 46 The significance
of this amendment to the meaning of human dignity is Professor Terrell's argument that "the competitive forces of the marketplace can
also establish a protective buffer between the individual and government in certain circumstances. '47 Professor Terrell calls for a distinction between exchange transactions and government largesse, because
the latter is assumed to involve needy persons incapable of exercising
flee choice. 48 According to Professor Terrell, "the government, as a
regulated 'monopolist,' is prevented from extracting certain monopoly
rents."49 In exchange transactions on the other hand, the forces of the
marketplace are available as a potential competitive balance. Thus,

40. Id.
41. Professor Terrell observes that the most persistently troubling issue has been "whether
and to what extent procedural protections attaching to government entitlements are as constitutionally sacrosanct as substantive rights." Id. at 357. Terrell restates the issue as "whether an
individual may waive certain procedural protections, such as a pretermination hearing, when
accepting government largess." Id. at 358.
42. See id. at 359 (Court will not treat the phrase "life, liberty, or property" as "a unitary
concept").
43. Id. at 365. Professor Terrell notes Professor Mashaw's argument that "due process is
a substantive end in itself [because it] is a basic principle of individual dignity." Id.
44. Id. Professor Terrell adds that "[slurely a complete account of [human dignity] will
demand an accounting of this element of autonomy as well." Id.
45. Id. at 370-71.
46. Id. at 371.
47. Id. at 372.
48. See id.
49. Id.
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he sees liberty as having a meaningful role to play in market transactions. 50
Professor Terrell recognizes, however, that unmitigated reliance
on market forces would turn out to be illusory. Some limitation is
essential on what can be contracted away, if there is to be any reasonable protection of recognized property interests. Professor Terrell
finds such a limiting principle in the economic notion of "error cost
analysis."' 51 In some bargaining situations, the value of rights to the
participants may not be commensurable. 52 Professor Terrell draws the
corollary of this proposition: when "incommensurable values are not
at stake, then rights themselves certainly can be the legitimate subject
matter of contractual negotiation and compromise." Professor Terrell
concludes that a proper due process analysis in entitlement cases would
turn on whether the rights are deemed to be commensurable.5 Professor Terrell concedes that this position represents a "more constrained
attitude ' on his part regarding contractual waiver.3 Thus, in spite
of the rather grand sounding statements regarding individual liberty
and the necessity of individual responsibility if liberty is to be taken
seriously, 57 Professor Terrell concludes much more modestly and indeed only in criticism of the universally criticized result of the Court
in the Loudermill case.
In light of the careful qualifications Professor Terrell places on his
application of liberty, one is left to ask precisely how much responsibility would be left to the individual to exercise independent of the
Court's protecting hand. Ironically, Professor Terrell's careful efforts
to preserve a role for liberty and its attendant responsibility, qualified

50. "Liberty mandates that individuals, as part of their dignity, take some responsibility
for their unforced choices." Id. at 373.
51. Id. at 379. Professor Terrell defines error cost analysis as the situation in which "the
parties to a transaction would be unable to measure the impact of the transaction on either
themselves, third parties, or both." Id. at 380.

52.
53.

Id.
Id.

54. Id. at 382 ('"The real issue is whether the procedural rights involved in these cases
somehow endangered incommensurable values and therefore should be removed from the market.").
55. Id. at 384.
56. Professor Terrel's present view is that in nonmonopoly situations 'the rational relationship requirement can also serve as a standard for assessing whether an individual in fact
exercised freedom of choice in waiving a right." Id. at 384.
57. For example, Professor Terrell concludes "[ilf that element [of liberty] is to have any
meaning in the land of new property, then individuals must be assumed to accept some measure

of personal accountability for their own voluntary choices." Id. at 385.
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as extensively as they are, may lend a degree of authenticity to the
somber vision of Charles Reich that gave rise to the concept of "big
law" in the first place. In this same regard, the role the Court has
carved out for itself to supervise the adequacy of procedural protections provided in various voluntary state programs must be noted.
Even with Professor Terrell's suggested revision, the Court's due
process jurisprudence will still be legalistic analysis. If so, then how
can the aspiration to legality represented by the due process clause
flourish in such a formalistic environment?
Patricia Smith's comment on Professor Terrell's article raises two

basic questions. First, she criticizes his "positivistic approach to legal
analysis in general." Second, she attacks his "market model of due
process adjudication. '"5 Despite an overly broad definition of positivism
that might otherwise cause problems, 59 Professor Smith's focus on
positivism is right on point with regard to the entitlement cases. As
noted previously, those entitlement cases are widely criticized as representing precisely such a positivistic analysis of language and are
therefore subject to the critique Professor Smith offers of the abuse
of positivistic analysis. It is less clear that Professor Terrell shares

58. Smith, Commentary on Terrell: Definition and Metaphor in Legal Analysis, 39 U.
FLA. L. REV. 387, 387 (1987).
59. Professor Smith's definition is so broad that it could encompass not only the linguistic
analysis she mentions but could include any kind of analysis of concepts. Id. at 389. She appears
to see the positivist enterprise as including all efforts to make theory "coherent, accessible,
supportable, and predictable." Id. at 388. Her definition, however, would include the entire
common law tradition epitomized in the work of Coke, Mansfield, and Blackstone. More recently,
the work of such legal theorists as Karl Llewellyn and Lon Fuller has criticized the positivist
position on the grounds that its purported predictability is illusory, precisely because it falls to
take into account the sociological and historical factors necessary for accurate prediction. Professor Smith adopts the common criticism of positivist analysis that it leads to rigidity and formalism.
The cause of this rigidity, however, is that the courts do not do a good enough job of "serious
conceptual analysis." Instead, "[tlhey are applying their own linguistic intuitions and assuming
that those intuitions are representative of common use." Id. at 390. This abuse is compounded
in her view when courts represent this shallow linguistic product as "conceptual analysis of
objective data leading to determinate conclusions derived from the objective meaning of the
terms: the language of the law." Id. Many legal scholars would object to this view, but not on
the grounds that the courts are necessarily doing a better job than Professor Smith suggests.
The objection would be that, at least most of the time, whatever language the courts are
analyzing is not with a view to arriving at the 'intuitions" that are "representative of common
use." Id. The typical judicial exercise is in framing arguments regarding the meaning of language
that has developed special meanings in the context of prior judicial decisions. Hence, any parallel
between the meaning of language for the courts and its common linguistic usage will often be
rather incidental. In any event, judicial efforts, even when focused on linguistic analysis, are
not often limited to that alone.
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that sin. Professor Terrell has chosen to work within the linguistic
paradigm established by the entitlement cases. Only by working within
that paradigm can he hope to present persuasive arguments that the
paradigm is not entirely consistent. ° One might choose to argue, as
Mashaw does, that any analysis based on such linguistic positivism is
doomed to a formalism that results in absurdity. But the fact that
Professor Terrell seeks to persuade the Court on its own positivistic
terms does not necessarily mean that Professor Terrell himself shares
the vice of positivism.6 1 Of course, Professor Terrell's efforts depend
upon continuation of the current "entitlements" paradigm. All of his
work could be eclipsed at any time, if the Court were to decide that
the present paradigm is mistaken and return to adjudication based on
a unitary treatment of "life, liberty, and property" rather than the
particularized analysis presently employed in such cases.
Professor Smith also criticizes Professor Terrell's argument that
the market is relevant in determining how much due process is needed
to constrain governmental powers. 62 Although the market imposes
restraint under some circumstances,6 it provides no significant protection to replace the constraints imposed by due process.61 That, however, is not the argument Professor Terrell meant to offer, and Pro-

60. See Moffat, Judicial Decision as Paradigm: Case Studies of Aorality and Law in
Interaction, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 297, 337-340 (1985).
61. In Professor Smith's view the vice of positivistic analysis is not doing the linguistic
analysis well enough. See Smith, supra note 58, at 390. I see the vice of positivism as taking
the linguistic analysis as though it were analysis of reality. See Moffat, The Perils of Positivism,
10 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 295, 297-305 (1987). The Court may or may not really believe
that its analysis is of what property and liberty actually are, but the vice of positivistic formalism
is to assume that the Court in its analysis is "really" talking about property and liberty.
62. Professor Smith notes that the purpose of due process in cases of governmental arbitrariness involving government entitlements would be twofold. First, "one major purpose of due
process in such cases would be to retard prospectively the likelihood of arbitrariness through
the threat of the existence of judicial review." Smith, supra note 58, at 392. But a second
purpose would be that "if arbitrariness does occur, the purpose of due process would be to
provide an avenue of correction." Id. at 392-93. The significance of Professor Smith's observation
is that, to the extent that the market is effective, neither of these due process protections
would be required. On the other hand, due process protection would serve as a backup to any
check on arbitrariness provided by the market. Hence, she concludes that due process protections
would not interfere with any protections provided by the market. Id. at 394.
63. See id. The market would provide protection only where an individual has special skills
or where there is a shortage of qualified employees. Under such conditions of scarcity, employers
will provide more protections in order to attract workers than they would otherwise do. Thus,
the protections the market would provide are quite limited. Id.
64. Id. Professor Smith concludes: "The point is that the function and aim of a market is
fundamentally different from the function and aim of due process." Id.
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fessor Smith concedes that fact. Instead, his argument is that governmental arbitrariness should be acceptable within permissible limits,
and he poses for himself the task of delineating what those permissible
limits might be.6 The problem is that Professor Smith disagrees with
Professor Terrell's fundamental assumption that there should be some
67
limitations on possible challenge to arbitrary governmental action.
Moreover, she argues that focusing on the individual's liberty is misleading. Her preference is that the courts, rather than administrative
agencies or legislatures, should make decisions as to procedures.6 In
this preference she seems inattentive to Grant Gilmore's fear that due
process would expand into such a monstrous empire of legalism that
it would swallow us up. On a smaller scale he would presumably also
fear that government agencies would become so hamstrung by potential litigation that incompetent or dishonest employees would never
69
be discharged.
Nonetheless, Professor Smith seems correct in describing the liberty Professor Terrell advocates as amounting only to a choice as to
whether to accept the government job. Talk of waiver is empty: 0

65. Id. at 395 ("Professor Terrell is not arguing for the prevention of governmental arbitrariness.").
66. Professor Smith summarizes Professor Terrell's view as asking "why should government
have to be fair when it is acting in its capacity as an employer in a nonmonopoly situation?
Why should government have to offer employees a better deal than private employers would?"
Id. at 396. Professor Smith finds totally unpersuasive the notion that governments should be
allowed to operate in the market the same as private entities. So far as she is concerned, "the
Constitution is intended to limit government power, to constrain governmental abuse, to protect
individuals from improper governmental action." Id. The question raised by her argument is
whether there should be any limits on the ability of citizens to challenge governmental action
which they dislike in cases in which they are somehow involved.
67. Moreover, we must bear in mind that much of the argument is centered, not on whether
the citizen should be able to challenge arbitrary governmental action, but on when the citizen
will be permitted such a challenge. For example, the only question in the Loudermill case was
whether Loudermill should be able to challenge his termination prior to discharge rather than
after he had been fired. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 532.
68. Professor Smith wants us to attend to the fact that it is possible to "describe the
situation by focusing on the actions of the government employer." Smith, supra note 58, at
398. If we did so, our concern would be "should the governmental agency have the total power
to grant or deny a right to a pretermination hearing in an employment situation"? Id.
69. Precisely that complaint has been made to me by professionals employed by the federal
government regarding the support services available to them.
70. Professor Smith states, "The choice is not whether to waive or not waive a due process
right. The choice is whether or not to take the job." Id. She finds it misleading to speak of
waiving rights. She asks, "was there any way that any of them could have avoided selling or
waiving the right?" Id. at 399. She answers her own question: "If there is no viable way to
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Moreover, Professor Terrell's new addition of error cost analysis provides
no rescue to his argument regarding waiver. The notion of incommensurability is unhelpful, because the vagueness of rights, rather than
their importance, becomes the criterion for judicial protection.71 A
further difficulty with any actual judicial attempt to determine the
incommensurability of rights would be the virtual impossibility of such
a calculation? 2 In summary, Professor Smith's critique raises fundamental questions as to the tenability of Professor Terrell's market
model, of his theory of waiver, and of his proposed use of error cost
analysis as a check on the limits of waiver. The market model does
not seem helpful in thinking about the problem of entitlements. However, Professor Smith points out that "a theory of reasonable choice"
might provide a satisfactory solution to Professor Terrell's problem.73
Her suggestion might be acceptable to Professor Terrell, because a
notion of reasonable choice is consistent with the objectives of error
cost analysis.
Nonetheless, even a theory of reasonable choice would not respond
to the problem posed by Professor Smith's fundamental assumption
that government should always be called to account for arbitrary actions, even when those actions occur in the context of a market in
which the government's action is indistinguishable from the action of
others. The difficulty is that she does not offer arguments to support
that assumption. We do not know whether she could justify her insistence on full due process protection from every possible governmental

avoid waiving or selling the right, then what does the putative meaningful choice amount to,
and what can it mean to take responsibility for it? These cases are not about the sale or waiver
of rights on the part of individuals who have any options with regard to those rights." Id.
71. Again her attack is unrelenting. She wants to know "why should a vague but trivial
right be protected by due process, but not a specific and important right?" Id. She cannot see
any necessary relation between the incommensurability and the importance of a right. Professor
Terrell argued that incommensurable rights would be ones that the bargainers could not intelligently waive. But Professor Smith wonders if the fact that they are important but clear rights
offers any reason to accept their waiver. Her skepticism arises from her conviction that the
notion of waiver is meaningless in the context of the illusory market choice available to the individual.
72. Such a process "requires enormous amounts of information, not to mention considerable
expertise in the interpretation and evaluation of data, which poses a virtually insurmountable
problem for courts as they are presently constituted." Id. at 402. One possible response to that
critique would be to propose that the courts not engage in an actual calculation of incommensurability but rather in a hypothetical or postulative calculation. Perhaps in that way, courts could
work out some kind of model as to which rights could be "bargained" away in the hypothetical
market and which rights were 'Incommensurable."
73. Id. at 404.
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arbitrariness. Consequently, we also do not know how far toward
legalism she would be willing to have the Court take the due process
clause in supposed service to the cause of legality for which the clause
is presumed to stand.

VI.

DUE PROCESS AS A SUBSTANTIVE
GUARANTEE OF PROCEDURE

Lawrence Alexander argues that "the meaning of procedural due process is determined by the various substantive constitutional values at
stake when rules and policies are applied in particular cases." 74 How
does he respond to the central question how to determine whether
procedural due process is required in a given case? His answer is
drawn directly from his premises: "Whether procedure is due depends
upon whether substantive constitutional values are at stake." 75 Does
that mean that an aggrieved citizen is entitled to a trial-type hearing?
Many advocates of a free-standing right to procedure have believed
that due process requires trial-type hearings. Professor Alexander
strenuously disagrees. He argues persuasively that the procedure that
is due varies according to what is an appropriate fact-finding procedure
under the particular circumstances and with due regard to the substantive rights being determined. 76 His persuasiveness on this point is
vital to the success of his theory. The requirement of trial-type hearings in every case involving substantive constitutional rights would
push due process far down the road to legalism. Instead, Professor
Alexander argues for a range of procedures appropriate under varying
conditions, because his objective is to have due process serve the
cause of legality.7

74. Alexander, The Relationship Between ProceduralDue Process and Substantive Constitutional Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987). He provides several variants on his
formulation: that procedural due process is substantive in nature; that there is no independent
procedural value in procedural due process; that substance and procedure are intimately linked;
that "a realistic concern with substance entails a concern with procedures by which rules are
applied." Id. at 325. He believes: "A free-standing constitutional right to procedure would be
a loose cannon on the jurisprudential deck." Id.
75. Id. at 330. Conversely, it also follows that, "[ilf substantive constitutional rights are
at stake, then some procedures are always constitutionally required." Id. at 332.
76. Hence, due process may guarantee only that one is entitled to have one's ship inspected
in order to determine whether the vessel is seaworthy. Professor Alexander states, "such
determinations need not be made through a trial-type hearing to satisfy procedural due process"
and "procedural due process is not synonymous with trial-type hearings." Id. at 338.
77. One advantage of Professor Alexander's position is that he avoids the problem already
noted of determining precisely when procedure is due for government entitlements. He argues
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In order to explain why his theory linking procedure to substantive
constitutional values is universal, Professor Alexander joins Professor
Mashaw in criticizing the difference in due process treatment between
action under legislative rules and the absence of procedural constraints

when administrative discretion is involved. 7s One possible explanation
of this difference in treatment may lie in the distinction that the late
Lon Fuller drew between legal rules and managerial direction. Adjudi-

cation requires legal rules, whereas managerial direction does not
require general rules and operates on the basis of discretion. 79 Such
governmental discretion is widespread, and Professor Fuller considered it essential to effective government operation. Although the
Court has not put its approach in Fuller's terms, it may instinctively
recognize that distinction on pragmatic grounds. When the administrative agency applies legal rules, judicial review of that adjudication is

possible. But meaningful review of administrative discretion will be
virtually impossible, because there are no established legal standards
to assist in determining relevant facts and that could be applied to
any facts that could be found. Clear abuse of discretion would be the
only exception.
Courts have traditionally avoided such thickets in which the only
possible review would be the substitution of a second discretionary
decision. That judicial attitude is exemplified in the traditional reluc-

that such views are mistaken. They postulate "that only when the government converts an
optional benefit from a mere privilege into 'property' or 'liberty' does the due process clause
require certain procedures . . . . The problem this position faces is developing a theory to
account for when and why a mere privilege is transformed into 'liberty' or 'property' protected
by constitutionally-mandated procedures." Id. at 339. Professor Alexander believes that the
efforts both of the Court and of the commentators to formulate a theory that would provide
such an explanation have been "unconvincing." Id. at 339. In this respect he refers specifically
to Professor Terrell and disagrees with his notion that the government's "monopolistic position
with respect to the benefit or its adequate substitutes should determine whether procedures
are constitutionally required." Id. Professor Alexander wishes to quarrel with Professor Terrell,
however, only if Professor Terrell is unwilling to accept the proposition that all procedural
values are substantively anchored. Professor Alexander concludes: "Government monopoly is
not a good argument for concern only with adjudicative procedures." Id. He does, however,
criticize Professor Terrell's notion of waiver of non-monopolized privileges. In Professor Alexander's view, "waiver begs the question of what constitutional rights regarding procedure define
the baseline from which waivers are or are not made." Id. at 339-40.
78. Professor Alexander finds the distinction the Court has made "between legislative rules
and administrative discretion," puzzling. He cannot see how it can be "significant in the context
of procedural due process." Id. at 340.
79. L. FULLER, supra note 18, at 207-13.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss2/19

18

Moffat: Legality or Legalism? Some Critical Reflections on the Quest for
CONFERENCESUMM3ARY

tance to review criminal sentences. ° A similar attitude may be at
work in the decisions refusing to impose restrictions on the exercise
of administrative discretion. But that fact need not pose a fatal difficulty for Professor Alexander's analysis, because he argues that a
sliding scale of procedures is required, the elaborateness of the process
to be dictated by the substantive constitutional values involved. Professor Alexander argues that trial-type hearings are often not required
by due process. Even though that kind of review is not within the
realm of possibility in the review of administrative discretion, a degree
of minimal due process is still provided in the right to obtain judicial
review for abuse of that discretion.
Edmund Pincoffs' comment on Professor Alexander's paper offers
useful clarification of Professor Alexander's thesis. Professor Pincoffs
concludes that the most promising formulation of Professor Alexander's thesis is that procedural guarantees are derived from substantive
constitutional guarantees.,1 More important, Professor Pincoffs asks,
if Professor Alexander's thesis is correct, why was the due process
clause added to the Constitution?s One possible answer (posed in the
introduction to the present article) is that substantive constitutional
values are worthless, unless they are accompanied by a due process
requirement that guarantees their non-arbitrary administration. That
demand seems so fundamental that we are likely to consider it implicit

80. Sentencing decisions by trial judges were for many years virtually immune from review
on appeal because they were reviewed only for the rare and extreme instance of abuse of
discretion. Recent reforms in sentencing procedures have required judges to apply complex sets

of rules within a strict framework and to offer written reasons to defend any departure from
the set guidelines. Appeal is now, not only possible, but quite easy and has become remarkably

frequent. The reason for this surge of appeals is that rule-based adjudication of sentencing
decisions facilitates adjudicative review because the reviewing court can assess the persuasive-

ness of the reasons offered by the trial court to justify its decision. Moreover, the reviewing
assessment is made in terms of the legal standards provided.
81. Pincoffs, Commentary on Alexander: Substance, Procedure, and the Measuring of
Margins, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 345, 346 (1987). Professor Pincoffs further reformulates this

notion as the idea that "given certain substantive constitutional values, and given what is
constitutionally at stake in a particular case, we have everything we need to determine whether
any, and if any what kind of, procedure is due." Id. Even after this reformulation, Professor
Pincoffs is troubled by the fact that he does not know how Professor Alexander would define
a substantive constitutional value, so that he is in the dark as to what the consequences of

using his scheme might be.
82. Id. at 348. He adds, "Is it mere redundancy for emphasis that informed the decision
to incorporate the due process clause?" Id. at 348-49. It does seem unlikely that the framers
of the Constitution were engaging in mere window-dressing in adding the due proces requirement.
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in the substantive guarantees, so that making due process explicit
might still seem like surplusage. Another possibility is that Professor
Alexander could claim, as he sometimes seems to, that procedural due
process is itself a substantive value. That sounds reasonable enough,
but it has the difficulty of making unclear what his claim adds to what
we already know. Professor Alexander's claim, put in that form, poses
the danger of trivializing due process.
Professor Pincoffs shares that worry. Professor Alexander sees
accuracy of determinations as what due process accomplishes. But
accuracy is insufficient in some of the cases in which Professor Pincoffs
thinks justice demands due process. He believes that due process is
needed as a guarantee against arbitrariness, and mere accuracy is not
necessarily a guarantee against arbitrariness. He argues that our
right not to be treated arbitrarily by the government should itself be
considered a substantive value; therefore, procedural due process is
itself a substantive constitutional value.& The value of legality in his
view requires that non-arbitrariness be considered a fundamental value
in our constitutional scheme. Acceptance of that claim should not degenerate into legalism, because legality can be sought only where legal
standards are available.8 Professor Pincoffs' concern is that we accept
the avoidance of arbitrariness as a fundamental value not satisfied by
mere accuracy.86

VII.

DUE PROCESS AS FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE

Roderick Macdonald provides an instructive analysis of the Canadian Constitution's new8 due process provision, a concept labeled "fun-

83. Id. at 349. Discriminations, according to Professor Pincoffs, must be "reasonableones."
Id. That requires not merely accuracy, but non-arbitrariness. An examination of the merits of
a question and not of mere form is required. There must be a relationship between form and
substance.
84. Professor Pincoffs argues that our right 'to be subject only to the rational application
of the rules of government" is itself a claim so fundamental that it should be viewed as substantive. Id. at 350.
85. Thus, if governmental action does not take legal form and is instead managerial direction,
the demand of legality would not apply. In this respect, we should note that Professor Pincoffs,
like Professor Alexander, does not assume that 'trial-type" hearings are mandated in all cases
in order to avoid arbitrariness.
86. Alternatively, if Professor Alexander's claim is understood as only that the extent of
procedural guarantees cannot be determined independent of the substance of the right to be
protected, I believe that Professor Pincoffs would have no quarrel with that position.
87. Of the adoption of the provision, Dean Macdonald notes: 'For the first time, a constitutional democracy in the common law tradition enacted a written due process guarantee without
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damental justice" in their Charter.8 Dean Macdonald's contribution
serves American readers by reminding us how our concept of due
process rests upon assumptions normally not examined. Two such
typical American assumptions are the existence of unrestricted judicial
review and the supremacy of the constitution. Those assumptions do
not hold under the Canadian Charter. That fact may surprise Americans, since Canadians share, not only the common law tradition, but
the common roots of our due process history in the tradition of natural
justice originating in the decision of Lord Chief Justice Coke in Dr.
Bonham's Case. 9 In the United States, that tradition was absorbed
into the due process clause of the federal Constitution and of the
various state constitutions. In England and the Commonwealth including Canada, those cases developed into the common law principle of
natural justice that Dean Macdonald traces. Americans will be interested to note that the provision of the Canadian Charter displaced
neither the common law principle of natural justice nor the previous
statutory Bill of Rights.9 Thus, the Canadian Charter provision will
coexist with the common law and statutory doctrines in a complementary fashion91
To this point, the Canadian courts have declined to interpret fundamental justice as augmenting procedural due process under Canadian law.9 That situation may change in the future, but several factors
deter the creative transmutation of procedural justice into a comprehensive due process clause. Most significantly, the Charter provision may be routinely overridden by a simple majority of any legislature under section 33.93 Thus, the courts operate with the legislatures

at the same time undergoing a political revolution." Macdonald, ProceduralDue Process in
Canadian ConstitutionalLaw: NaturalJustice and FundamentalJustice, 39 U. FLA. L. REV.
217, 218 (1987).
88. The provision reads as follows: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice." Constitution Act, 1982, Pt. I, § 7, Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, sched. B

(U.K.).
89. 8 Co. Rep. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610).
90. Macdonald, supra note 87, at 230-31.
91. The Canadian situation presents the courts there with the problem of working out an
accommodation between the various possible sources of due process. Their situation presents
an interesting contrast to the swallowing up of common law due process by the American
constitutional provisions.
92. See id. at 255. Dean Macdonald states: "[tjhe purely proceduralcontent of fundamental
justice is apparently identical to that of modern day natural justice and procedural fairness." Id.
93. Id. at 250.
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looking directly over their shoulders. This factor leads Dean Macdonald
to conclude that natural justice as a common law principle, though
invoked more cautiously, is "respected more universally by parliament." 94 At the same time, the Charter's fundamental justice is only
a legislated standard, 95 and legislatures may not render it great respect.9 The American reader will note that these trends contrast
sharply with American due process practice. However, the Canadian
courts have been reemphasizing the common law tradition of Lord
Justice Coke in moving their due process conception more toward
common law principles of legality and away from their earlier tendency
toward legalism.
Jerome Bickenbach's comment on Dean Macdonald's paper seeks
to take the Dean's thesis further by describing "a distinctive Canadian
perspective on the point of the law."-9 For a Canadian, that means to
state how Canada differs from the United States. Professor Bickenbach's method is to take Ronald Dworkin's distinction between principles and policies as a statement of the predominant American view
of the point of law. He then contrasts the Canadian situation by noting
that two different Charter provisions in the Canadian Constitution
make policy superior to principle. Section 33, previously mentioned,
empowers the legislatures to exempt legislation from the limits of
fundamental justice. In addition section 1 has a catch-all proviso that
makes the protection of rights "subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society."98 Both of these provisions mean that policy will
be "constitutionally trumping principles." 99
These aspects of the Canadian constitutional scheme will no doubt
fascinate Americans, but this conflict of policy and principle is rather

94.

Id. at 254.

95. As such, it "does not necessarily require its own justification. Courts may well be
tempted, in consequence, to treat it as flat." Id. at 264.
96. These factors may explain some trends in early Charter cases, summarized by Dean
Macdonald. He notes that "the Court has already rejected its own legalistic Canadian Bill of
Rights jurisprudence: it has consistently pursued a generous interpretive strategy more in
keeping with the methodology of the common law." Id. at 265. Moreover, the Court "has made
a concerted effort to weave the Charter into Canada's existing constitutional arrangements.
That is, the Court accepts that the ultimate authority of the Charter flows from common law
constitutional principles." Id. at 266.
97. Bickenbach, Commentary on Macdonald: The Principles of Fundamental Justice Prospects for CanadianConstitutionalism,39 U. FLA. L. REv. 269, 270 (1987).

98.

Id. at 275.

99.

Id.
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different from Dworkin's theory of the proper judicial role.' °' Dworkin's
normative theory would be violated if courts were to make policy
decisions, and the Canadian constitutional scheme does not anticipate
asking courts to do any such thing. In fact, both Dean Macdonald and
Professor Bickenbach emphasize the strong Canadian tradition of nonpolitical judicial decisionmaking. The constitutional provisions Professor Bickenbach discusses do not alter that judicial responsibility; they
simply provide limitations in which the legislative decision will take
priority over a possible judicial one. An argument similar to Professor
Bickenbach's could be made in the United States, because the Constitution gives Congress power to make exceptions and limitations to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. That potential for limiting the scope
of judicial review could be offered as an example of policy trumping
principle in our system. But American commentators tend to be upset
by the notion of such legislative limitations on the scope of judicial
review. Hence, the fact that the Canadian legal-political tradition accepts such legislative strictures on the scope of judicial action does
provide Professor Bickenbach with a legitimate claim to have stated
a distinguishing feature of the Canadian legal tradition.
Jennifer Sharpe's valuable commentary provides an interesting
overview of due process developments in Australia. Australia has a
constitution with judicial review, but the constitution contains no Bill
of Rights and no due process clause. Consequently, all procedural due
process there is meted out under common law principles of natural
justice. Recent statutory developments have augmented available due
process review.10' Coinciding with these statutory developments, Professor Sharpe traces a broadening of the traditionally narrow view of
natural justice in the Australian courts similar to the Canadian development that Dean Macdonald traces. 10 2 In the process of this judicial

100.

R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82-90 (1978).

101. The most interesting is the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which provides a general
review by an independent tribunal of a wide range of administrative decisions. Nonetheless,
Professor Sharpe notes that 'ithas become apparent that there are a large number of administrative decisions that are unsuitable for review by an independent, appointed tribunal." Sharpe,
Commentary an Macdonald: Qualifying Justice - Procedural Due Process in Australia, 39
U. FLA. L. REV. 281, 283 (1987). It seems likely that this category of cases consists of discretionary determinations in which legal rules are not formulated and therefore their application
cannot be reviewed. The other major development is the Administrative Decisions (Judicial
Review) Act, which provides for judicial review in the Federal Court of Australia of a wide
range of administrative decisions. Id. at 285-86.
102. Professor Sharpe notes that "Australian Courts have slowly moved away from" traditional requirements. Id. at 287.
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broadening of the scope of natural justice, a variable concept of due
process has emerged that is responsive to the concern raised by Professor Alexander. 10 3
Despite all of this growth of procedural due process in Australia,
Professor Sharpe notes that a number of the provisions now taken
for granted in the United States under the Administrative Procedure
Act have not been adopted in Australia. For example, the scope of
judicial review is still rather limited in comparison with the expectations we have under our constitutional tradition. The Australian quest
for legality has made some strides, but is still hampered at least to
some degree by the Australian tradition of legalism.?° The overall
parallels in the expansion of due process in Australia with both Canada
and the United States create a notable phenomenon. It is coincident
with increasing societal complexity and the exponential growth of governmental regulation in modern industrial society. In the face of such
overwhelming government power, any democracy with even somewhat
liberal tendencies will find it well nigh impossible to resist the pressure
to provide protection for the ordinary citizen from the abuse of governmental arbitrariness.
VIII.

DUE PROCESS AS A CIVIL PROCEDURE

Winston Nagan's contribution reminds American lawyers of the
foundation of civil procedure that make our concept of due process
meaningful. In the midst of our constitutional preoccupation with due
process, Professor Nagan undertakes to help us recall that the fundamental underpinnings of due process lie in the common law heritage
of our rules of civil procedure. Being so reminded of our common law
roots, we discover we are not quite as different from Canada and
Australia as we first thought. Professor Nagan also proposes to challenge the sincerity of our exposition of the fairness we claim to be
the goal of due process. Thus, he contrasts the ideal of fairness presented in the state extraterritorial jurisdiction cases with the apparent
compromise in the Court's acceptance of creditor self-help provisions.
Professor Nagan's skepticism in light of the Court's apparent lack of
good faith in the bill collector cases leads him to describe the dedication

103. See id. at 289-90. Professor Sharpe states: '"The duty of fairness may be satisfied by
informing an affected person of the contents of relevant reports or by providing a summary of
information intended to be taken into account, coupled with an opportunity to make written
submissions before a final decision is reached." Id.
104. See Moffat, PhilosophicalFoundations of the Australian ConstitutionalTradition, 5
SYDNEY L. REV. 59, 87-88 (1965).
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to fairness in the state court jurisdiction cases as a "great myth system
°5
of due process of law in civil litigation.''
Professor Nagan also addresses the substance/procedure distinction
on the ground that viewing ideal procedural rules as neutral with
regard to substantive ends is a type of legalism. 106 Instead, he claims
the two must be viewed in interaction, a point made by other contributors including Professor Alexander. However, Professor Nagan
argues that determinations as to what is procedural and what is substantive should be made entirely on the basis of what is deemed in
the common interest. That criterion seems too vague. 0 7 Granted that
precision is not possible here, the criterion used to judge the substance/
procedure interrelation should be the overall goal of the process, which
is legality. Professor Nagan may leave some readers uneasy on this
point, for he appears to reject the notion that procedure should secure
substantive justice. 0 8 But he wants to make us aware that the relation
of substance and procedure and the task of achieving justice is more
complex than we are prepared to admit. 10 9 Professor Nagan's object
is to show how, despite complexity, civil procedure can come closer
to living up to its goal of rationality, 10 an achievement essential if due
process is to secure greater legality.
Toni Massaro takes seriously Professor Nagan's condemnation of
the lawyer's perspective on the fairness of civil procedure and joins
in pursuing the observer's perspective as the way to evaluate the
justice of procedural rules."' She takes as a case study for this purpose
the lawyer's advantage protected by the workproduct rule of Hickman
v. Taylor."2 That rule frequently puts noninstitutional litigants at
great disadvantage in obtaining the discovery that would enable them

105. Nagan, Civil Process and Power: Thoughts from a Policy-OrientedPerspective, 39 U.
FLA. L. REV. 453, 468 (1987).
106. Id. at 471.
107. Id.
108. Regarding the view that the objective of civil procedure is to vindicate substantive
justice, Professor Nagan comments that "this seems like putting the proverbial cart before the

horse." Id. at 480.
109. See id. at 483. Professor Nagan notes that
system is that it maintains a low visibility aspect
the values of fairness, equality, and reasonableness
and complex rules." Id.
110. Id. Professor Nagan states: "Optimally

"an accurate description of our civil procedure
of constitutional law in the broad sense that
are at least assumed to undergird the diverse
then, the rules of civil procedure aspire to

'rationality'." Id.
111.
112.

Massaro, Commentary on Nagan, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 497, 498 (1987).
329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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to pursue their claims effectively,113 a result clearly unjust in Professor
Massaro's view. Although she remains perplexed as to what a law
teacher should do about it, she supports Professor Nagan's call for
extensive and thoroughgoing re-examination of the principles of procedure in order to secure the fairness that is the object of the system.
The legalistic attitude that rules such as the workproduct doctrine
generate among lawyers rightly worries Professor Massaro. Clearly
a legalistic mentality is inconsistent with the struggle for legality.
Those readers who believe that the best material is usually found
in the footnotes will take particular delight in the exchange carried
on in the footnotes between Michael Bayles and Professor Nagan.
Professor Bayles is unwilling to accept Professor Nagan's dichotomy
of critical standpoints that requires siding either with the ideal observer or with the lawyer. Professor Bayles believes that a superior
standpoint for judging the fairness of procedural rules would be to
view them as a potential litigant. Presumably, this potential litigant
is also an ideal observer, combining both the objective search for
justice and the practical interests of a potential participant in the
process.114 Professor Bayles states a persuasive case for his claim,
examining several procedures the fairness of which seem to be clarified
from the viewpoint of the potential litigant. We cannot know, however,
whether Professor Nagan would disagree. That answer will have to
wait until their debate continues. Regardless, Professor Bayles does
not reject Professor Nagan's "call to examine how the system actually
works." 115 Though Professors Bayles and Nagan appear to be divided
as to how to achieve the goal, they both believe that our goal should
be procedural rules that are optimal in achieving legality. They both
agree that our procedural rules require detailed scrutiny in light of
the fundamental objectives of procedural due process.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The contributions to this symposium exhibit the wide diversity one
would expect in such an interdisciplinary setting. Philosophers commenting on lawyers' substantive papers is novel. How did the experiment turn out? Overall, I rate the philosophers' critiques as a success.
They raised questions somewhat different from those that legal commentators would have asked. More important, the lawyers were pres-

113.
114.
115.

Massaro, supra note 111, at 499-500 & n.10.
Bayles, Commentary on Nagan, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 491, 493 (1987).
Id. at 496.
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sed to respond to new questions, thus extending their analyses. However, we should not overlook a different sort of interdisciplinary
character of the contributions, for the contributors are not all teachers
of constitutional law. A variety of legal specialties is represented: civil
procedure, criminal procedure, and administrative law, as well as constitutional law. Thus, we have the advantage of views of due process
from a number of disciplinary vantages, providing a much broader
perspective on due process than we would find among discussants
versed only in constitutional law. Significantly, this broader perspective helps to make clearer the twin challenges for due process: to
avoid the trap of legalism and to secure the objective of legality.
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